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When agents are liquidity constrained, two options exist — sell assets or borrow. We compare 
the allocations arising in two economies: in one, agents can sell government (outside) bonds 
and in the other they can borrow by issuing (inside) bonds. All transactions are voluntary, 
implying no taxation or forced redemption of private debt. We show that any allocation in the 
economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with outside bonds but that the 
converse is not true. However, the optimal policy in each economy makes the allocations 
equivalent. 
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In monetary economies, households often face binding liquidity constraints. In such situations,
they can acquire additional liquidity by selling assets or by borrowing. Several papers have studied
the case where households can sell nominal government bonds (outside bonds) for money while
others allow households to borrow money (issue inside bonds) to ﬁnance consumption.1 These
diﬀerent methods for relaxing liquidity constraints raise the following question: following the logic
of Modigliani-Miller, do these alternative ﬁnancing arrangements of household consumption lead
to equivalent allocations? Our focus in this paper is to address this question.
Within a common monetary framework, we consider two economies: one in which households
trade outside bonds and one in which they trade inside bonds. Two main results emerge from our
analysis. First, any allocation in the inside bond economy can be replicated in the outside bond
economy. The converse is not true. Second, if government policy is set optimally in both economies,
then the allocations are the same.
The key assumption for attaining these results is that all trades among private agents and
between private agents and the government must be voluntary. For the inside bond economy, this
implies that redemption of inside bonds must be voluntary. For the outside bond economy, it means
that the government cannot levy taxes so private agents must be willing to pay a nominal ‘fee’ to
receive government services. This implies that the government is constrained in how much revenue
it can generate to redeem outstanding government debt. In short, for both economies individual
participation constraints must be taken into account.2
The key feature that makes the allocations equivalent across the two economies is the cost
associated with participating in the bond market. In the inside bond economy, if a household
defaults on its debt, it is excluded from trading in the bond market until it repays its debt. In the
outside bond economy, we assume the government can charge a fee to participate in a bond market
that it operates. If a household does not pay the fee, it is denied access to this bond market.3 In
this way, households face a similar participation decision in either economy: whether they should
incur a cost today (repay loans or pay the fee) to have access to bond markets.
We show that for an arbitrary money growth rate, the allocation in the inside bond economy
can be replicated in the outside bond economy by an appropriate choice of the fee. In general, the
converse is not true. Hence, allocations can diﬀer across the two economies. We then show that
in the outside bond economy it is optimal to have the government charge the maximum fee — one
that makes an individual indiﬀerent between participating in the bond market or not. Under this
policy, the allocation in the outside bond economy will always be equivalent to that in the inside
1Examples of the ﬁrst method include [12], [17] and [19, 20]. Examples of the latter include [1], [4], [5] and [7].
2In a recent paper, [13] emphasizes that many results in the literature rely on asymmetric collection powers of
private and government entities. To eliminate this asymmetry, we assume that all trades must be voluntary. With
this assumption we ensure that any diﬀerences in allocations that arise are not the result of inherent diﬀerences in
the collection powers across public and private entities.
3In short, the government provides a particular ﬁnancial service for private agents who have to pay for this service.
This idea is motivated in part by [3], who looks at voluntary payment of fees to receive interest on money in the
Lagos-Wright framework.
2bond economy. Finally, we show that for suﬃciently high discount factors, the optimal policy for
both economies is to have a positive inﬂation rate.
At ﬁrst glance our result that the government should charge the maximum fee to trade in the
outside bond market seems counter-intuitive; most economists would probably argue that imposing
a fee to participate in the bond market would inhibit trade and lower welfare, not raise it. However,
the result is actually quite intuitive. Assume the participation constraint in the outside bond econ-
omy is not binding. In this case, marginally raising the fee does not deter agents from participating
in the outside bond market, yet it allows the government to extract money from the economy. This
reduces the inﬂation tax on money thereby raising its return and improving welfare. In short, this
result is an application of standard public ﬁnance theory: If lump-sum ‘taxes’ are available to the
government, then it is optimal to use them to reduce distortionary taxes. Since the participation
fee is a lump-sum payment, the government can impro v ew e l f a r eb yu s i n gi tt ot h ef u l l e s te x t e n ti n
order to reduce the distortionary tax on money.
Finally, our result that the optimal inﬂation rate is positive may also be surprising. For the
inside economy, those who default on their bond redemptions must carry more cash to trade.
Inﬂation taxes those additional balances and makes the punishment for default worse. This loosens
borrowing constraints and leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate that can be paid on ‘idle’
balances. As a result, the real value of money and welfare increase. For the outside bond economy
a similar line of reasoning holds. Those who do not pay the fee must carry more cash and inﬂation
taxes those balances, which makes them more willing to pay the fee. Greater fee collection allows
the government to pay a higher nominal interest rate on its bonds, which in turn makes money
more valuable since excess holdings can be used to acquire bonds and this improves the allocation.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of related literature.
Section 3 describes the environment. Sections 4 and 5 examine the economies with outside bonds
and inside bonds, respectively, and Section 6 compares the allocations of the two economies. Section
7 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
Our equivalence result is reminiscent of Wallace’s Modigliani-Miller type result [24] for open market
operations. In an overlapping generation model, Wallace shows that the method for ﬁnancing
government spending, either by issuing money or holding interest-bearing real assets, does not
aﬀect the equilibrium allocation. A critical element for proving his result is that the government
has access to lump-sum taxation.
Our equivalence result is also related to recent papers by Kocherlakota [13] and Hellwig and
Lorenzoni [9]. Kocherlakota considers various models of asset trade. In these models, households
can trade a privately issued one-period bond, a publicly issued one-period bond, or publicly is-
sued money. He proves that the allocations for these economies are equivalent.4 As noted by
4In an earlier paper, [22], a related equivalence result between money and credit is derived.
3Kocherlakota, for these results to hold, the government and private households must have the same
enforcement powers, implying the government has access to lump-sum taxes and private lenders
can force some repayment of loans. However, in Kocherlakota’s model money plays no role in
transactions. We obtain our equivalence result for economies with limited enforcement and for
environments where trade requires a medium of exchange.
Hellwig and Lorenzoni assume the same enforcement structure as we do. They compare two
economies: one with inside bonds and no enforcement of repayment and the other with unbacked
government debt (outside bonds). In the latter environment, the government cannot force house-
holds to pay taxes and households cannot force the government to redeem debt in real goods. They
show that the allocations in the two economies are equivalent — any allocation in the inside bond
economy can be replicated in the outside bond economy and vice versa. This is driven by the fact
that unbacked government debt in Hellwig and Lorenzoni’s model is equivalent to ﬁat money, which
means that ﬁat money and government bonds are identical assets. In our framework, money and
government debt have diﬀerent liquidity properties and hence they are not identical assets.
Several other papers are related to what we do here. Kehoe and Levine [11] compare allocations
in a dynamic economy when households can acquire consumption goods in one case by selling their
capital holdings and in another case by issuing debt subject to a borrowing constraint. They
show that if households are suﬃciently patient, the allocations are the same in a deterministic
environment, but if they are suﬃciently impatient, then the economy where agents issue debt leads
to a better allocation. Note that they study trade in real assets while we analyze trade in nominal
assets. Furthermore, they do not examine government policy in their economies, whereas we do.
Shi [20] examines the implications of illiquid bonds in a monetary search model where there are
legal restrictions preventing bonds from being used as a medium of exchange in some transactions
but not in others. The legal restrictions make outside bonds less liquid than money. He ﬁnds that
having legal restrictions can be welfare improving. In [17] households with idle money holdings can
buy illiquid outside bonds directly from the government who ﬁnances the interest payment through
lump-sum taxes. The authors show that the opportunity to buy interest-bearing bonds is strictly
welfare improving because it allows households with idle money to save.5 A closely related paper is
[7] who study the eﬀects of monetary policy on privately supplied credit in the Bewley [6] economy.
Like in our paper, money is needed for transaction purposes and agents who default on their loans
are excluded from participating in the credit market. The authors show that inﬂation increases the
incentives to repay loans since it lowers the expected lifetime utility of an agent who is excluded
from the private bond market. Finally, the paper is also related to [3] and [10], who analyze the
impact of participation constraints on allocations arising in the Lagos-Wright framework.
5Furthermore, there are a number of papers that study the coexistence of money and bonds (e.g., [8], [21], and
[23]). The key diﬀerence with our work is that they never compare the allocative eﬀects of diﬀerent bonds.
43 The environment
Our basic framework is the divisible money model developed in [16]. This model is useful because
it allows us to introduce heterogeneous preferences while still keeping the distribution of money
balances analytically tractable.6 Time is discrete, and in each period there are three perfectly
competitive markets that open sequentially. The ﬁrst market is a bond market where agents trade
money for bonds. The second market is a goods market where they trade money for goods. In the
third market, agents produce and consume and readjust their portfolios.
The economy is populated by two types of inﬁnitely lived agents: households and sellers. Each
type of agent has measure 1. There are two non-storable and perfectly divisible consumption
goods at each date: market 2 goods and market 3 goods. Non-storable means that they cannot be
carried from one market to the next. Households consume in market 2 and consume and produce
in market 3. Sellers produce in market 2 and consume in market 3. The common discount factor
across periods is  =( 1+)
−1  1,w h e r e i st h et i m er a t eo fd i s c o u n t .
At the beginning of each period, before the bond market opens, the household receives a pref-
erence shock . The preference shock  has a continuous distribution  () with support [0 ],i s
iid across households, and is serially uncorrelated. Given , the period utility of a household is
()+() − 
where () is the household’s consumption utility in market 2, () is the household’s con-
sumption utility in market 3, and  is the disutility of working  hours in market 3. The utility
function in market 2 satisﬁes 0()  0, 00()  0,a n d0(0) = +∞. Furthermore, we assume that
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion,  ≡− 000, is constant.7 The utility function in market 3
satisﬁes 0()  000()  0, 0(0) = ∞,a n d0(+∞)=0 . Households can also produce market
3 goods with a constant returns to scale production technology where one unit of the consumption
good is produced with one unit of labor  generating one unit of disutility.8
Sellers produce in market 2 with a constant returns to scale production technology where one
unit of the consumption good  is produced with one unit of labor  generating one unit of
disutility. Their utility of consuming  in market 3 satisﬁes ()=. Accordingly, the period
utility of a seller is
 − 
6An alternative framework would be [18] which we could amend with preference and technology shocks to generate
the same results.
7The last restriction on preferences is only used in the proofs of Proposition 3 and 9. All other proofs do not
require a constant relative risk aversion.
8The idiosyncratic preference shock  plays a role similar to random matching and bargaining in [16]. Depending
on the realization of , households will spend diﬀerent amounts of money in the goods market. Then, without
quasilinear preferences and unbounded hours in market 3, the preference shocks would generate a nondegenerate
distribution of money holdings since the money holdings of individual households would depend on their history of
shocks. For tractability, we therefore impose assumptions, as in [16], that make the portfolio choices of households
at the end of the settlement market independent of their trading histories.
5Note that the sellers do not play an important role in our analysis. What we get from the sellers
is a ﬁrst-order condition that pins down the relative price between market 2 and market 3 goods.
Furthermore, since they have linear disutility of producing in market 2 and linear utility of con-
suming in market 3 (with equal margins), they are irrelevant for the welfare calculations when we
derive optimal policy.9
3.1 First-best allocation
We assume without loss of generality that the planner treats all sellers symmetrically. He also
treats all households experiencing preference shock  symmetrically. Given this assumption, the
weighted average of expected steady-state lifetime utility of households and sellers can be written
as follows:
(1 − )W =
Z 
0
[()+ () − ] ()+ −  (1)
where  is hours worked by an −household in market 3 and  is consumption of an −household
in market 2. The planner maximizes (1) subject to the feasibility constraints
Z 
0
 () −  ≤ 0 (2)
Z 

( − ) ()+ ≤ 0 (3)




)=1 for all  (4)
These are the quantities for the households chosen by a social planner who is able to dictate




3.2 Information frictions, money, and credit
To motivate a role for ﬁat money, search models of money typically impose three assumptions on the
exchange process [20]: a double coincidence problem, anonymity, and costly communication. First,
our preference structure creates a single-coincidence problem in market 2 since buyers do not have
a good desired by sellers. Second, agents in market 2 are anonymous, which rules out trade credit
between individual buyers and sellers. Third, there is no public communication of individual trading
outcomes (public memory), which in turn eliminates the use of social punishments in support of
gift-giving equilibria. The combination of these frictions implies that sellers require immediate
9In an earlier version of this paper we had just one type of household; at the beginning of the period, an
idiosyncratic shock determined whether the household became a buyer or a seller in the goods market. Furthermore,
the buyer experienced the same idiosyncratic preference shock  as in the current version of the paper. This earlier
version generated the same results as the current version, but its exposition was considerably less elegant.
6compensation from buyers. In short, there must be immediate settlement through the exchange of
some durable asset and money is the only durable asset. These are the micro-frictions that make
money essential for trade in market 2. In contrast, in market 3 all agents can produce for their
own consumption or use money balances acquired earlier. In this market, money is not essential
for trade.10
3.3 Outside bonds versus inside bonds
We analyze equilibria of the model under two diﬀerent bond markets — a market for outside bonds
and one for inside bonds. Outside bonds are nominal government debt obligations, whereas inside
bonds are private debt obligations.
Outside bond economy In the outside bond economy, we assume a government exists that
controls the supply of ﬁat currency and issues one-period, nominal bonds. These bonds are perfectly
divisible, payable to the bearer, and default free.11 One bond pays oﬀ one unit of currency at
maturity. The government is assumed to have a record-keeping technology over bond trades and
bonds are book-keeping entries — no physical object exists. This implies that households are not
anonymous to the government. Nevertheless, despite using the record-keeping technology to track
bond trades, the government has no record-keeping technology to track goods trades.
At time , the government sells one-period, nominal discount bonds in market 3 and redeems
bonds that were sold in  − 1.A tt h es t a r to f +1 , the idiosyncratic shocks  are revealed. Then
households trade bonds and money in a secondary bond market. The government acts as the
intermediary for all bond trades, by recording purchases/sales of bonds, and redistributing money
receipts. Trading in the secondary bond market is what matters for our comparison to the inside
bond economy since it allows households to readjust their portfolios trades after the idiosyncratic
shocks are realized.
Private households are anonymous to each other and thus are incapable of arranging and hon-
oring intertemporal promises. Since bonds are intangible objects, they are incapable of being used
as media of exchange in market 2 and hence are illiquid. Since households are anonymous and
cannot commit, a household’s promise in market 2 to deliver outside bonds to a seller in market 3
is not credible. Consequently, ﬁat money is essential for trade in market 2.
Inside bond economy Inside bonds are ﬁnancial claims on private households, issued in a
private bond market. Consequently, issuing inside bonds is equivalent to receiving credit. Almost
by deﬁnition, credit requires record-keeping over private trading histories, and borrowers must
reveal their identity. It is exactly this tension that makes it diﬃcult to have money and credit
coexist in microfounded models. Thus we follow [5] and assume that a limited record-keeping
technology exists in market 1 that can track ﬁnancial transactions. Thus, while households are
10One can think of agents being able to barter perfectly in this market. Obviously in such an environment, money
is not needed.
11The government has no incentive to default since it redeems its bonds by printing money at no cost.
7anonymous to each other, they are not anonymous to ﬁnancial intermediaries.12 In market 1, after
the idiosyncratic shocks are realized, the intermediaries acquire nominal debt obligations from
borrowers and issue nominal debt obligations on themselves to depositors, which are securitized by
their acquired claims. In market 3 all debt obligations are settled. We assume that intermediaries,
like the government, can commit to honor their debt obligations. Thus, the key ﬁnancial trades in
both economies occur in market 1 after the idiosyncratic shocks have been realized.
We assume perfect competition among ﬁnancial intermediaries. The nominal interest rate on
loans is denoted by . We assume that any funds borrowed or lent in market 1 are repaid in market
3. Given the discrete time aspect of the model, loans are technically ‘intra-period’ loans, whereas
in reality they can be thought of as an inter-period loan. For example, consider a loan taken
out at 23:59 on December 31 or one taken out at 00:01 on January 1 with both being repaid the
following December 31. The ﬁrst is an ‘inter-period’ loan and the latter is an ‘intra-period’ loan.
While technically diﬀerent, there is no serious economic diﬀerence between the two loans. Thus,
our intra-period loans should be thought of this way: funds are borrowed early in the period and
repaid late in the period.
One can show that due to the quasi-linearity of preferences in market 3 there is no gain from
multi-period ﬁnancial contracts. Furthermore, since the idiosyncratic shocks are revealed prior to
contracting, the one-period nominal debt contracts that we consider are optimal.
Limited enforcement We consider economies where all trades must be voluntary. For the
outside bond economy, this means that the government faces a constraint on how much revenue it
can generate to redeem outstanding government debt. For the inside bond economy, this means
that repayment of debt must be voluntary — creditors have no power to collect unpaid debts.
For the inside bond economy, unpaid debt has two consequences for a household. First, it
receives no further loans until the debt is repaid. Second, it cannot save by acquiring nominal
debt obligations from the ﬁnancial intermediary, unless it repays any outstanding debt. These
two assumptions imply that a household that defaults on its debt is excluded from participating in
future bond markets. Thus, repayment of debt is the price for participating in future bond markets.
Given these rules, we derive conditions to ensure voluntary redemption and show that this may
involve binding borrowing constraints; i.e., credit rationing.
For the outside bond economy, the government can charge a participation fee for trading in
the bond market.13 The fee has to be paid before the households learn the realization of the
12An example is a bank that accepts nominal deposits and makes nominal loans. While the bank knows who it
trades with, borrowers do not know the identity of depositors and vice versa. This limited record-keeping technology
is similar to an ATM machine — agents can identify themselves to the ATM machine and either borrow or deposit
cash. Agents cannot borrow or deposit consumption goods at the ATM. These cash transactions can be recorded and
interest is charged to borrowers and paid to depositors. Thus, while there is record-keeping over ﬁnancial transactions,
the ATM machine has no idea what a borrower does with the borrowed cash; i.e., there is no record of how the cash
is used for buying consumption goods in market 2.
13In an environment, where all trades must be voluntary, lump-sum taxes are not feasible. If lump-sum taxes were
feasible in our environment, the government could implement the ﬁrst-best allocation by running the Friedman rule.
See [15] for the optimality and implementation of the Friedman rule in the search theory of money.
8preference shock . Households that do not pay the fee cannot buy newly issued government bonds
or trade them in the secondary bond market. The government can do this because outside bonds
are intangible objects and the trades among private households in the secondary bond market are
executed by the government, since it controls the record-keeping technology.14 As a result, paying
the fee is similar to repaying one’s debt: it is the price for participating in the bond market.15
3.4 Government policy and the money supply process
In this section we describe the evolution of the money stock for each economy. In both economies
we assume that the government does not purchase any goods with money issuance or revenues
received from bond sales. This is without loss of generality.
Outside bond economy Denote  as the per capita money stock and  as the per capita
stock of newly issued bonds at the end of period . Fiat currency pays no interest. Then −1 is
the beginning-of-period money stock in period .L e t−1 denote the nominal fee charged by the
government in market 3 of period  to participate in the bond market. We deﬁne the nominal fee as
being proportional to the aggregate money stock for mathematical ease. If   0, the government
collects a positive fee from households to access the bond market; if   0, then the government
is actually paying households to use the bond market. The change in the money stock in period 
is given by
 = −1 − I−1 + −1 −  (5)
where I ∈ [01] is the measure of households that choose to pay the fee in . Given our assumptions
that the government does not purchase goods or levy taxes, (5) is the government’s temporal budget
constraint. If I =1 , then all households pay the fee and   0 can be interpreted as the fraction
of the aggregate money stock that is withdrawn from the economy from payment of fees. The total
change in the money stock comprises two components: ﬁrst, the net diﬀerence between the cash
created to redeem bonds, −1, and the net cash withdrawal from selling  units of bonds at the
price ; second, the cash withdrawn from households that pay the fee  to access the secondary
bond market.16 A government policy is a sequence {  }
∞
=1 that satisﬁes (5) given the initial
values 0 0  0.
Inside bond economy In the model with inside bonds, the government controls only the amount
of ﬁat currency in the economy. In this case, the government can only inject lump-sum transfers
14Note that there can be no pairwise deviations since agents are anonymous and cannot commit to honoring
inter-temporal promises. For example, the following deviation is not possible: 1) agent  pays the fee, 2)  collects
money from agent  to buy bonds while promising to pay back the value of the bonds in market 3. Agent  would
always renege on the promise and  cannot force redemption. If such a deviation were possible, then money would
not be essential for goods trades in market 2.
15One could consider imposing a fee to access the inside bond market as well. Since we assume free entry of
intermediaries and zero operating cost, the fee would be driven to zero.
16We want to emphasize that we do not impose a lump-sum tax. The diﬀerence is that the payment of the fee is
voluntary which limits the revenue a government can collect.
9of money, −1, to households. As a result, the money stock evolves as
 =( 1+)−1 (6)
We assume that these lump-sum transfers of cash are given only to households that participate in
the bond market and the transfer is received in market 3. Since all exchange must be voluntary, a
government policy is a sequence { ≥ 0}
∞
=1 given an initial value 0  0.
4 Outside bonds
In this section, we analyze the economy with outside bonds. For notational ease, variables corre-
sponding to the next period are indexed by +1, and variables corresponding to the previous period
are indexed by −1. The money price of goods in market 3 is , implying that the goods price of
m o n e yi nm a r k e t3 is  =1 .L e t be the money price of goods in market 2the money price
of bonds in market 1 and  the money price of newly issued bonds in market 3.
4.1 Seller choices
Sellers produce market 2 goods with linear cost ()= and consume in market 3, obtaining
linear utility ()=. It is straightforward to show that sellers are indiﬀerent as to how much
they sell in market 2 if
 =1  (7)
Since we focus on a symmetric equilibrium, we assume that all sellers produce the same amount.
With regard to bond holdings, it is straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, sellers are indif-
ferent to holding any bonds if the Fisher equation holds and will not hold bonds if the yield on the
bonds does not compensate them for inﬂation and time discounting. Thus, for brevity of analysis,
we assume that sellers hold no bonds.
4.2 Household choices
Now we characterize (i) a household’s choices under the assumption that it pays the fee −1 and
therefore has access to the bond market and (ii) the optimal choices for a deviating household that
does not pay the fee. This allows us to derive the set of fees for which it is individually rational to
participate in the bond market.
Let  () be the expected value from entering market 3 with  units of ﬁat money and 
units of nominal government bonds at time .L e t  denote the quantity of goods bought by a
type  household in market 2 and  the quantity of government bonds bought by a household of
10type  in market 1. Then, in market 3, the problem of a representative household in period −1 is
−1 (−1 −1)= m a x
−1−1{}










= −1 + −1
¡
−1 + −1 − −1−2
¢
(8)
 −  ≥ 0 ∀ (9)
 +  ≥ 0 ∀ (10)
 −  −  ≥ 0 ∀ (11)
Constraint (8) is the  − 1 budget constraint in market 3 constraints (9) and (10) are the period
 short-selling constraints on money and bonds in market 1 and constraint (11) is the period 
budget constraint for purchasing goods in market 2. Note that households choose  and  in −1
before the realization of the period  shock . Given these choices of  and , households then
choose the state-contingent values  and  for all .
Using the market 3 constraint to eliminate −1 we get the following program:
−1 (−1 −1)= m a x
−1{}
 (−1) − −1 + −1
¡










[()+ ( −  − + )] ()
s.t. (9) - (11).





−1 (−1 −1)=−1 (13)
Let , ,a n d denote the multipliers on (9), (10), and (11), respectively. Using (7) and
(13), the ﬁrst-order conditions are
−1 :0 = 0 (−1) − 1











 :0 = 0() − 1 −  ∀
 :0 = 1 −  −  +  −  ∀
It is straightforward to show that, in any monetary equilibrium,  =0and   0 for all 0.
11This follows from the fact that households will never sell all their money for bonds or ever carry
money (and forgo interest-bearing bonds) that will not be spent on market 2 goods. It then follows
from these expressions that the remaining multipliers are
 = 0() − 1 and  = 0() − 1
T h el a s te x p r e s s i o ni m p l i e st h a tf o r  0,t h e household is constrained by its bond holdings;
i.e., it sells all of its bonds for money to acquire goods in market 2.W h e n =0 ,t h e household
trades oﬀ the interest payment on the bond to the marginal liquidity value of having an extra dollar
in market 2. In short, it may sell some but not all of its bonds or actually buy bonds with some of
its extra cash. Whether or not this constraint is binding for all households or only for a fraction of
households drives the equilibrium allocation.










With regard to consumption in market 3, we get 0 ()=1in all . With regard to consumption
in market 2, because a household’s desired consumption is increasing in , there is a critical value
for the taste index ˜  such that if  ≤ ˜ ,  =0and if  ≥ ˜ ,  ≥ 0.F o r ≤ ˜ ,  solves
0()=1 ∀ ≤ ˜  (16)
If  =˜ , the critical household sells all its bonds in market 1 and spends all its money in market
2t oa c q u i r e˜  units of goods. It then follows that households with  ≥ ˜  consume the same ˜ .
Accordingly, in market 2 a household’s consumption satisﬁes
 =
(
0−1 [1()] if  ≤ ˜ 
0−1 [1(˜ )] if  ≥ ˜ 
 (17)
Note from (16) that for those households that are unconstrained, the marginal utility of consumption
is equalized. Given these consumption choices and the pricing conditions, we get the following bond
demands:
 ∈ [−] if  ≤ ˜ 
 = − if  ≥ ˜ 
(18)
4.3 Equilibrium
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria where households participate in the bond market and
money is used as a medium of exchange. Such equilibria meet the following requirements: (i)
12households’ decisions solve the maximization problem (12); (ii) the decisions are symmetric across
all households with the same preference shocks; (iii) the relative price between market 2 goods
and market 3 goods satisﬁes (7); (iv) the goods and bond markets clear; (v) all real quantities are
constant across time; (vi) the law of motion for the stock of money (5) holds in each period.
Point (v) requires that the real stock of money is constant; i.e., −1 = +1.T h i si m p l i e s
that +1 = −1 ≡ ,w h e r e is the gross steady-state money growth rate.17 Symmetry
requires  = −1 and  = −1. The restriction that there is a positive demand for money and
bonds requires that the following pricing relationship holds in equilibrium:
−1 =  (19)
This relationship comes from (14) and (15). It implies that the bond price has to be the same
between market 3 and market 1 in period +1. Moreover, in a stationary equilibrium the bonds
price  has to be constant. This can be seen for example from (16), where a changing  involves
a non-stationary path for consumption. A constant bond price then implies that the bond-money
ratio has to be constant, and this can be achieved only when the growth rates of money and bonds
are equal.18
We assume there are positive initial stocks of money 0 and outside bonds 0.19 Assuming




 − (1 − )
1 − 
 (20)
From this equation the government has two independent policy instruments. We study the case
where the government chooses the fee  and the gross growth rate of the money supply  which
requires that the initial bonds ratio satisﬁes (20).







 ()=0  (22)
where  is aggregate production by sellers. Note that, since the entire stock of money is held
by the households that then spend it all in market 2, in any equilibrium aggregate production in
market 2 is equal to the real stock of money; i.e.,  = −1. To see this, note that bond demand
17Note that we consider the beginning-of-period nominal stock of money and deﬂate it by the end-of-period price
of goods.
18To see this, consider the budget constraint of the critical household ˜  =  + . Then, in equilibrium,






. Thus, since in a stationary equilibrium ˜ ,
−1 and  are constant,
−1
−1 must be constant.
19Since the assets are nominal objects, the government can start the economy oﬀ by one-time injections of cash
0 and bonds 0.
13is  = −. The market clearing condition (21) then implies that −1−
R 
0  ()=0
since  = −1. Multiplying by , using (22) to substitute
R 
0  (), and noting that  =1
yields  = −1.
Finally, the requirement that households participate in the bond market imposes an upper bound
on . The participation constraint requires that the diﬀerence between the expected discounted
utility of a household that participates and the expected discounted utility of a household that does
not participate in the bond market is non-negative. In the proof of Proposition 1 we show that this
condition is summarized by the inequality
ΩO (˜ ) ≥ 0 (23)
where the function ΩO (˜ ) depends only on policy (), the endogenous cutoﬀ value ˜ ,a n d
the endogenous bond price .
The equilibrium can be of two types. Either some households are constrained in market 1 (i.e.,
  0 for  ≥ ˜ ) or none are constrained.
Proposition 1 For the outside bond economy, an unconstrained equilibrium is a policy () and
endogenous variables (˜ ) that satisfy (23) and
ΦO (˜ ) ≥ 0 (24)
 − ˜  =0 (25)
 −  =0  (26)
The term ΦO (˜ ) in (24) is derived from the budget constraint of the household with
the largest preference shock. The inequality reﬂects the fact that an  household must have
enough funds to buy ,w h e r e solves 0()=1 . Equation (26) is obtained by using
0()=1for all  in (15). To verify whether an unconstrained equilibrium exists for a given
policy () set the bond price to  =  and the critical value to ˜  =  a n dt h e nc a l c u l a t et h e
participation constraint (23) and the feasibility constraint (24). If both hold, the equilibrium exists.
All remaining endogenous variables can then be calculated as follows: From (17), consumption
satisﬁes  = 0−1 [()]; from (22), production and the real stock of money is  = −1 =
R 
0  (). Finally, from the government budget constraint (20) one obtains −1.
Proposition 2 For the outside bond economy, a constrained equilibrium is a policy () and
endogenous variables (˜ ) that satisfy (23) and
ΦO (˜ )=0 (27)










 ()=0  (29)
14The term ΦO (˜ ) in (27) is derived from the budget constraint of the critical household
with preference shock ˜ .I tr e ﬂects the fact that all households with  ≥ ˜  must have enough funds
to buy ˜ ,w h e r e˜  solves ˜ 0(˜ )=1 . Equation (29) is obtained by using 0()=1for all
 ≤ ˜  and ˜ 0(˜ )=1for all  ≥ ˜  in (15). To verify whether a constrained equilibrium exists for a
given policy (),o n eﬁrst derives  and ˜  by solving (27) and (29). Then one needs to check the
participation constraint (23) and the equilibrium condition ˜  . Other endogenous variables
can then be derived from (17), (20), and (22).
An interesting result is the diﬀerent interest rates prevailing in each equilibrium. In the un-
constrained equilibrium, the nominal interest rate satisﬁes the Fisher equation, 1+ =  =
(1 + )(1+). In the constrained equilibrium, the interest rate on bonds, 1+ =1   ,i s
lower than the value satisfying the Fisher equation. This implies that bonds in the constrained
equilibrium are ‘bad’ stores of value; i.e., no household would buy one in market 3 with the inten-
tion of simply holding it to the next market 3. In short, the marginal liquidity value of bonds from
relaxing households’ cash constraints increases the bond’s price and hence reduces its return below
the risk-free rate.20
From Propositions 1 and 2 it is evident that the government’s choice of  and  aﬀects which
equilibrium occurs. Given ,d e ﬁne ¯  () as the value of  such that ˜  = . W et h e nh a v et h e
following proposition:
Proposition 3 Consider a policy () such that the participation constraint (23) holds. Then,
there exists a 0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1,w h e r eΘ is deﬁned in the proof, such that the following is true. If Θ,
there exists a unique 1 − ¯  ()  ∞ such that the following is true. If  ≥ ¯  (),t h e na
unique unconstrained equilibrium exists, and if  ≤ ¯  (), a unique constrained equilibrium exists.
If Θ, a unique constrained equilibrium exists.
The essence of this proposition is that for suﬃciently low inﬂation rates, high  households
will face binding constraints on bond sales, and so 0()  1. In contrast, for suﬃciently high
inﬂation rates, all households are unconstrained, implying 0()=1for all .
Essential Illiquid Bonds Note that, if 1 then illiquid outside bonds are essential since they
improve the allocation relative to the money-only economy. This follows from two features of the
equilibrium allocation. First, at  =1 , from (16) we have 0()=1 , so unconstrained households
are consuming the ﬁrst-best quantity while constrained households consume less than the ﬁrst-best
quantities. By reducing  marginally, the consumption of the unconstrained households falls since
they sell some of their real balances for interest-bearing bonds. But the ﬁrst-order welfare loss
from this reduction in consumption is zero due to standard envelope arguments. By shifting real
balances to constrained households, their consumption increases and this generates a ﬁrst-order
welfare gain. Second, from (29), we see that a reduction in  from 1 causes ˜  to increase. This
20An econometrician observing the interest rate of an constrained economy would infer that the risk-free rate is
too low and conclude that there is a risk-free rate puzzle. A similar point has been made by [14].
15means fewer households are constrained, so the marginal utility of consumption is equated across
more households. Thus, the distribution of consumption is improved. As a result, these two eﬀects
imply that welfare is higher when bonds are illiquid and 1.T h i sc o n ﬁrms that Kocherlakota’s
[12] result can be extended to stationary, inﬂationary economies.
5 Inside Bonds
In this section, we analyze the model with inside bonds. In market 1,l o w households can use their
idle cash balances to acquire nominal bonds from the ﬁnancial intermediary, which are redeemed
in market 3.H i g h households can issue nominal bonds to the ﬁnancial intermediary and redeem
them in market 3. Inside bonds are perfectly divisible, and one inside bond pays oﬀ 1 unit of ﬁat
c u r r e n c yi nm a r k e t3.L e t denote the market 1 price of these inside bonds.21
5.1 Household choices
Let  () be the expected value from entering market 3 with  units of ﬁat money and  units
nominal bonds at time .L e t denote the quantity consumed by a type  household in market 2
and  the quantity of inside bonds bought by a household of type  in market 1.L e t denote the
maximal amount of bonds that a household can issue in market 1. Then, in the third market, the
problem of a representative household in period  − 1 is
−1 (−1 −1)= m a x
−1{}




[()+ ( −  −  )] ()
subject to constraints
 −  ≥ 0 ∀ (31)
 +  ≥ 0 ∀ (32)
 −  −  ≥ 0 ∀ (33)
Constraint (31) is the period  short-selling constraint on money; constraint (32) is the borrowing
constraint; and constraint (33) is the period  money constraint for purchasing goods in market 2.
Note that households choose  in −1 before the realization of the period  shock . Given the choice
of  households then choose the state-contingent values { }. Except for the choice of outside
bonds in market 3, the two maximization problems (12) and (30) are equivalent. Consequently, the
ﬁrst-order conditions (15)-(18) continue to hold in the inside bond economy.
Nevertheless, problem (30) diﬀers from problem (12) in one important way. In the inside bond
economy, the borrowing constraint (32) limits the amount of credit that a household can get.
21One-period contracts are optimal here due to the quasi-linearity of preferences. In short, linearity of utility in
hours worked means there are no welfare gains from smoot h i n gm a r k e t3l a b o ra c r o s st i m et or e p a yc u r r e n td e b t .
16Although the households take this constraint as exogenous, in equilibrium it is endogenously deter-
mined. The corresponding constraint in the outside bond economy is the short-selling constraint
(10). The crucial diﬀerence is that, in the outside bond economy,  is a choice variable of the
household; whereas, in the inside bond economy,  is determined by the ﬁnancial intermediary,
which calculates the maximal loan that a household is willing to pay back in market 3.
5.2 Stationary equilibria
We focus on symmetric stationary equilibria where households participate in the bond market and
money is used as a medium of exchange. Such an equilibrium meets the following requirements:
(i) households’ decisions solve the maximization problems speciﬁed above; (ii) the decisions are
symmetric across all households with the same preference shocks; (iii) the goods and bond markets
clear; (iv) all real quantities are constant across time; (v) the government budget constraint (6)
h o l d si ne a c hp e r i o d .
As for the outside bonds economy, point (iv) requires that the real stock of money is constant,
implying +1 = −1 =( 1 + ) ≡ . Symmetry requires  = −1. Market clearing in
market 1 and market 2 requires (21) and (22) to hold. Note also that since the entire stock of
money is held by the households who then spend it all in market 2, aggregate production in market
2 is equal to the real stock of money; i.e.,  = −1.
Finally, the requirement that households participate in the bond market imposes a lower bound
on  (recall that   0 means that a household borrows money). Existence of an equilibrium
with credit requires that the diﬀerence between the expected discounted utility of a household that
repays and the expected discounted utility of a household that does not repay is non-negative. In
the proof of Proposition 4 we show that this condition is summarized by the inequality
ΩI (˜ ) ≥ 0 (34)
where the function ΩI (˜ ) ≥ 0 depends only on policy , the endogenous cutoﬀ value ˜ ,a n d
the endogenous bonds price .
The equilibrium can be of two types. Either some households are constrained in market 1 or
none are constrained.
Proposition 4 For the inside bond economy, an unconstrained equilibrium is a policy  and en-
dogenous variables (˜ ) that satisfy (34) and
ΦI (˜ ) ≥ 0 (35)
 − ˜  =0 (36)
 −  =0  (37)
Inequality (35) is a feasibility constraint. The term ΦI (˜ ) is derived from the budget
constraint of the household with the largest preference shock. The inequality (35) reﬂects the fact
17that an  household must have enough funds to buy  where  solves 0()=1 .E q u a t i o n
(37) is obtained by using 0()=1for all  in (15).
Proposition 5 For the inside bond economy, a constrained equilibrium is a policy  and endoge-
nous variables (˜ ) that satisfy (34) and
ΦI (˜ )=0 (38)










 ()=0  (40)
The term ΦI (˜ ) in (38) is derived from the budget constraint of the critical household with
preference shock ˜ . The equation (38) reﬂects the fact that all households  ≥ ˜  must have enough
funds to buy ˜ . Equation (40) is obtained by using 0()=1for all  ≤ ˜  and ˜ 0(˜ )=1for
all  ≥ ˜  in (15).
In any equilibrium with 1, illiquid inside bonds are essential. The reasoning is the same
as in [5]; interest-bearing inside bonds allow households to earn interest on "idle" money balances.
This makes money more valuable, thereby raising  and consumption.
As was the case in the outside bond economy, the nominal interest rate satisﬁes the Fisher
equation, 1+ =  =( 1+)(1+), in the unconstrained equilibrium. When households are
credit-constrained, the interest rate on inside bonds, 1+ =1   , is lower than the value
satisfying the Fisher equation. In short, when households are credit-constrained, interest rates
must be low to induce repayment. This result is similar to that found by [2] and [9].
6 Inside versus outside bonds
We now state our ﬁrst proposition that relates the set of feasible allocations in the two economies.
Deﬁne max as the value of  such that the participation constraint (23) is binding.
Proposition 6 Any equilibrium allocation in the inside bond economy can be replicated in the
outside bonds economy by choosing the same money growth rate  and charging max.T h ec o n v e r s e
is not true.
Proposition 6 states that, for a given , the set of equilibrium allocations in the inside bonds
economy is a subset of the set of equilibrium allocations in the outside bonds economy. The reason
for this result is as follows. In the inside bond economy, the money growth rate is the only policy
instrument. The multiplicity of policy instruments in the outside bond economy is what drives
the converse part of the proposition: in the inside bond economy the government has only  as a
policy instrument to aﬀect the allocation. So in general, it is not possible to replicate the allocation
occurring in the outside bond economy via a choice of  alone.
Proposition 7 below contains a welfare ranking of these sets.
18Proposition 7 For a given  ≥ 1, the set of allocations that can be implemented in the outside
bond economy is weakly dominated in terms of welfare by the equilibrium allocation under  in the
inside bond economy.
The proof in the Appendix ﬁrst shows that in the outside bonds economy for a given value of 
welfare is strictly increasing in  in the constrained equilibrium and constant in the unconstrained
equilibrium for any  max. Then, since we can replicate the allocation of the inside bonds
economy by charging max, it has to be the case that an equilibrium in the outside bonds economy
with  max is strictly dominated in terms of welfare by the equilibrium allocation under the
same  i nt h ei n s i d eb o n de c o n o m y .
Proposition 7 is just an application of standard public ﬁnance theory: if lump-sum ‘taxes’
are available to the government, then it is optimal to use them. Since the participation fee is
eﬀectively a lump-sum tax, the government can improve welfare by using it to the fullest extent.22
From a policy point of view, this suggests that the private sector (the inside bonds economy) and
the public sector (the outside bonds economy) are equivalent mechanisms for providing insurance
against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks if the fee  is chosen optimally.
In the proof of Proposition 7 we also show that in a constrained equilibrium





  0. Thus, the welfare improving role of increasing  w o r k sa sf o l l o w s . F i r s t ,i tl o w e r s
consumption by households with ˜ , which has a negative eﬀect on welfare. It increases the
critical value ˜ , which means that more households have their marginal utility equalized. Finally,
it increases consumption ˜  of the constrained agents. The last two eﬀects are welfare increasing
and dominate the ﬁrst eﬀect. Note also that

  0; i.e., increasing the fee increases the nominal
interest paid in the secondary market. The higher interest rate allows agents with "idle" balances
to earn interest on it, which increases the demand for money and its value.
Proposition 8 The optimal value of  is the same in both economies. Consequently, the allocations
are the same in both economies under optimal policies.
To prove Proposition 8, since  ≥ 1 is required in the inside bonds economy, it is suﬃcient to
prove that no equilibrium exists in the outside bonds economy if 1. Then, if ∗ ≥ 1 denotes
the optimal policy in the inside bonds economy, we can replicate the corresponding allocation in
the outside bonds economy by choosing the policy (∗ max).
We end this section with a further characterization of the optimal policy. There are two in-
eﬃciencies in this economy that policy must try to overcome. First, when ˜  ,t h e r ei sa n
ineﬃcient allocation of consumption across households since some households are constrained while
others are not. As a result, the marginal utilities of consumption are not equalized. This is an ex-
22Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between a fee and a lump-sum tax. First, households are
not required to pay the fee. They are willing to do so only if they receive a utility-increasing service for it that
compensates them for the disutility of working to acquire the money to pay the fee. A tax has to be paid even if one
gets nothing for it. Second, since paying the fee is voluntary, the size of the fee is limited, which puts a constraint on
the policies that the government can implement.
19tensive margin ineﬃciency. Second, due to the time cost of holding money, the quantities consumed
by all households are ineﬃciently low if  .T h i si sa ni n t e n s i v em a r g i ni n e ﬃciency.
For our equivalence result, it is crucial that there is a secondary market for government bonds
and that this market opens after households learn their type. Without a secondary market or if
such a market opens before idiosyncratic uncertainty is resolved, trading in these bonds would not
improve the allocation in our model. Thus, a key diﬀerence between inside and outside bonds
is that trading of inside bonds is contingent to household’s idiosyncratic risk, whereas trading in
outside bonds is not unless a secondary market opens which allow agents to trade bonds for money
after observing their type. Our secondary market for government bonds therefore enables these
bonds to mimic the properties of a contingent asset.
Keeping in mind these two ineﬃciencies, we now characterize the optimal policy in both
economies.
Proposition 9 In either economy, it is optimal to set  such that ˜  .F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f ≥ ˜ ,
where 12 ≤ ˜ 1 is deﬁned in the proof, it is optimal to set 1.
The proof that it is optimal to set  such that ˜   is a straightforward application of
the envelope theorem. In the unconstrained equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption is
equalized across all households. It then follows that the only ineﬃciency is from  being too low
when  .C o n j e c t u r eap o l i c y such that ˜  =  implying that all households are unconstrained.
Now consider a marginal reduction in  causing ˜  . The loss from reducing ˜  below  is zero,
while there is a ﬁrst-order gain from lowering inﬂation and raising  for all households. Hence,
it is optimal to choose  such that ˜  . The second part of the Proposition states that it is
optimal to have some inﬂation if  ≥ ˜ .A t =1 ,  =1and the allocation is the same as the one
in a money only economy with  =1 .B yr a i s i n g and thereby reducing , the government allows
for better risk sharing but at the same time lowers consumption for the unconstrained households.
Whether this is beneﬁcial depends on the distribution  () and the discount factor . In the proof
of Proposition 9 we show how the critical value ˜  depends on the distribution. Finally, note that
12 ≤ ˜ 1 is a suﬃcient condition but not necessary for 1 being optimal.
7C o n c l u s i o n
When households are liquidity-constrained, two options exist to relax this constraint: sell assets
or issue debt. We have analyzed and compared the welfare properties of these two options in a
model where households can either issue nominal inside bonds or sell nominal outside bonds. The
key assumption of our analysis is the absence of collection powers by private households and the
government. The following results emerged from our analysis: First, for any positive inﬂation
rate, illiquid bonds are essential in both economies and thus generate societal beneﬁts. Second,
any allocation attained in the economy with inside bonds can be replicated in the economy with
outside bonds. The converse is not true. Finally, under the optimal policies, the allocations in the
20two economies are the same, as are the optimal money growth rates. We also showed that the key
element responsible for these two economies having equivalent allocations is a cost to participating in
bond markets. Thus, in a manner similar to the results of [3], [9] and [10], participation constraints
have important ramiﬁcations for analyzing allocations arising in monetary models.
21References
[1] S. Aiyagari, S. Williamson, Money and dynamic credit arrangements with private information,
J. of Econ. Theory 91 (2000) 248-279.
[2] F. Alvarez, U. Jermann, Eﬃciency, equilibrium and asset pricing with risk of default, Econo-
metrica 68 (2000) 775-797.
[3] D. Andolfatto, Essential interest-bearing money, J. of Econ. Theory, 145 (2010) 1495-1507.
[4] A. Aykol, Optimal monetary policy in an economy with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic
risk, J. of Mon. Econ. 51 (2004) 1245-1269.
[5] A. Berentsen, G. Camera, C. Waller, Money, credit and banking, J. of Econ. Theory 135 (2007)
171-194.
[6] T. Bewley, A diﬃculty with the optimum quantity of money, Econometrica 51 (1983) 1485-
1504.
[7] A. Diaz, F. Perrera-Tallo, Credit and inﬂation under borrower’s lack of commitment, Mimeo,
University Carlos III de Madrid (2010).
[8] L. Ferraris, M. Watanabe, Collateral secured loans in a monetary economy, J. of Econ. Theory
143 (2008) 405-424.
[9] C. Hellwig, G. Lorenzoni, Bubbles and self-enforcing debt, Econometrica 77 (2009) 1137-1164.
[10] T. Hu, J. Kennan, N. Wallace, Coalition-proof trade and the Friedman rule in the Lagos-Wright
model, J. of Polit. Economy 117 (2009) 116-137.
[11] T. Kehoe, D. Levine, Liquidity constrained markets versus debt constrained markets, Econo-
metrica 69 (2001) 575-598.
[12] N. Kocherlakota, Societal beneﬁts of illiquid bonds, J. of Econ. Theory 108 (2003) 179-193.
[13] N. Kocherlakota, Money and bonds: An equivalence theorem, Mimeo, University of Minnesota
(2008).
[14] R. Lagos, Asset prices and liquidity in an exchange economy, J. of Mon. Econ. (2010) forth-
coming.
[15] R. Lagos, Some results on the optimality and implementation of the Friedman rule in the
search theory of money. J. of Econ. Theory 145 (2010) 1508-1524 .
[16] R. Lagos, R. Wright, A uniﬁed framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. of Polit.
Economy 113 (2005) 463-484.
22[17] A. Marchesiani, P. Senesi, Money and nominal bonds, Macroecon. Dynam. 13 (2009) 189-199.
[18] S. Shi, A divisible search model of ﬁat money, Econometrica 65 (1997) 75-102.
[19] S. Shi, Nominal bonds and interest rates, Int. Econ. Rev. 46 (2005) 579-618.
[20] S. Shi, Eﬃciency improvement from restricting the liquidity of nominal bonds, J. of Mon.
Econ. 55 (2008) 1025-1037.
[21] L. Sun, Sustained societal beneﬁto fi l l i q u i db o n d s ,M i m e o ,U n i v e r s i t yo fT o r o n t o( 2 0 0 7 ) .
[22] B. Taub, Currency and credit are equivalent mechanisms, Int. Econ. Rev. 35 (1994) 921-956.
[23] I. Telyukova, R. Wright, A model of money and credit, with application to the credit card
debt puzzle, Rev. of Econ. Stud. 75 (2007) 629-647.
[24] N. Wallace, A Modigliani-Miller theorem for open-market operations, Am. Econ. Rev. 71
(1981) 267-274.
238A p p e n d i x
Allocation for a household that does not participate in the bond market
For many of the proofs that follow, we need to know the allocation of an agent who does not
participate in the bond market. Throughout the Appendix we indicate the choice variables of a
deviating household by a "ˆ".
It is straightforward to show that the quantities consumed by an agent who does not participate




0−1 (1) if  ≤ ˆ 





0(ˆ ) () (42)
where 0 ≤ ˆ  ≤  is the critical cutoﬀ for a household that does not participate and ˆ  are the






(ˆ  − 1) ()
The right-hand side is decreasing in ˆ  and approaches ∞ as ˆ  → 0. The left-hand side is a constant
larger than 0 for  . Accordingly, for any there exists a unique ˆ ()  . Finally, note
that a deviator brings in ˆ  =ˆ ˆ  (we use the notation ˆ ˆ  to indicate consumption of a deviator
with  ≥ ˆ ) units of money into a period and that expected consumption
R 
0 ˆ  () () and
expected utility
R 
0 [ˆ  ()] () depend on  only (through their interaction with ˆ ()). We
will use these results to derive the participation constraints in the following proofs.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof involves two steps. We ﬁrst derive the participation
constraint. We then derive the equilibrium conditions (24) and (26).
STEP 1: Participation constraint
To derive the participation constraint, consider a household of type  that enters market 3 in 
and that pays the fee in every period for all . Its expected payoﬀ in market 3 is





() ()+ (∗) − 
¾

where  are hours worked in the current period in market 3 if it pays the fee and  is expected
hours worked in future periods. Suppose a household deviates by not paying the fee in the current
and all future periods (we could also use the one-step deviation principle to arrive at the same
participation constraint). Since b  = ∗, a deviator’s expected discounted utility is





(ˆ ) ()+ (∗) − ˆ 
¾

24It then follows that the participation constraint satisﬁes  ≥  ˆ  ,w h i c hr e q u i r e s









ˆ  − 
´
 (43)
Deriving : On the equilibrium path, an  household arrives in market 3 with − −
money and  +  bonds that pay oﬀ o n eu n i to fm o n e y .I tl e a v e sm a r k e t3w i t h+1 money and
+1 bonds. Accordingly, current hours worked on the equilibrium path are
 = ∗ + (+1 + +1)+−1 − ( −  − ) − ( + ) (44)
Deriving ˆ : On the equilibrium path, an  household arrives in market 3 with − −
money and  +  bonds. If the household deviates by not paying the fee, it leaves market 3 with
ˆ +1 money and no bonds. Accordingly, current hours worked by a deviator are
ˆ  = ∗ + ˆ +1 − ( −  − ) − ( + )
The diﬀerence in current hours worked  − ˆ  is
 − ˆ  = −1 + (+1 + +1) − ˆ +1 (45)








since market clearing implies
R 
0  ()=0and  =1 . Using the government’s budget












: In the future a deviator holds ˆ  − ˆ  units of money arriving in market 3
and leaves with ˆ +1. A deviator’s market 3 hours are then
ˆ  = ∗ + (ˆ +1 − ˆ )+ˆ 








Thus the diﬀerence in expected hours worked is
ˆ  −  = (ˆ +1 − ˆ )+
Z 
0




25Using (45) and (47), we can write the participation constraint (43) as follows:






(ˆ +1 − ˆ )
where Ψ( ˆ ) ≡
R 
0 {[() − ] − [(ˆ ) − ˆ ]} (). Use the deviator’s critical consump-
tion ˆ  =ˆ ˆ , and the fact that on the equilibrium path +1 =  and +1 = ,t og e t






ˆ ˆ  (48)
Rewrite the government budget constraint (20) to get −1 (1 − )=−1 [ − (1 − )] , use it














Finally, in any equilibrium, −1 =
R 
0  (), which yields (23), which we replicate here:
0 ≤ ΩO (˜ ) ≡ 0 ≤











Note that, from (17),  depend on  and ˜  only. Moreover, as shown at the beginning of the
Appendix, ˆ  and ˆ ˆ  depend on  only. Accordingly, the right-hand side of (23) can be summarized
by the function ΩO (˜ ), which depends on policy (), the bond price , and the critical
cutoﬀ value ˜  only.
STEP 2: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (26), divide (15) by , substitute −1 by , and substitute 0() by 1 to get
 =1 . Inequality (24) is derived from  household’s budget constraint  ≤ −1 + −1.








We next use the government’s budget constraint (20) to substitute −1−1 to get the following
expression:
 ≤ −1
1 − (1 − )
1 − 

In any equilibrium, −1 =
R 
0  (). Use this to substitute −1,d i v i d eb y, and use (17)
to substitute all  to get (24):
0 ≤ ΦO (˜ ) ≡




() () − 1
Note that, from (17), the quantities  depend on  and ˜  only. Hence, the right-hand side of (24)
can be summarized by the function ΦO (˜ ), which depends on policy (), the bond price
26 = , and the critical cutoﬀ value ˜  =  only.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . To derive (29), divide (15) by , substitute −1 by , and use (17)








Finally, multiply by  and rewrite it to get (29).
The equilibrium condition (27) is derived from the critical household’s budget constraint ˜  =
−1 + −1. If we multiply the budget constraint by , we can write it as follows:







We next use the government’s budget constraint (20) to substitute −1−1 =
−(1−)
1− to get
˜  = −1
1 − (1 − )
1 − 

Use the market clearing condition −1 =
R 
0  () to substitute −1 and divide by ˜  to
get (27):
0=




(˜ ) () − 1
Note that, from (17), the quantities  and ˜  depend on  and ˜  only. Hence, the right-hand side
of (27) can be summarized by the function ΦO (˜ ) which depends on policy (), the bond
price , and the critical cutoﬀ value ˜  only.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . The proof involves two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we derive ¯  ().I nt h e
second step, we prove existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium.
STEP 1: Derivation of ¯  ()
Consider a policy () such that the participation constraint (23) is satisﬁed. If all households
are unconstrained, we have  ≤ −1 + −1 for all . Then, ¯  () is the value of  that solves
 = −1 + −1. If we multiply the −household’s budget constraint  ≤ −1 + −1 by








Use the government’s budget constraint (20) to substitute −1−1 to get the following expression:
 ≤ −1
1 − (1 − )
1 − 

In any equilibrium −1 =
R 
0  (). Replace −1 and  =  (recall that in an uncon-
27strained equilibrium the Fisher equation holds), and rearrange to get
1 − 





The right-hand side of (49) is independent of  due to constant relative risk aversion (which we
assume in the paper but is eﬀectively only used to prove this proposition). Moreover, we have
0 ≤
R 
0 () () ≤ 1. The left-hand side of (49) is decreasing in , and equal to 1 at
 =1−, and approaches 1− for  →∞ . Accordingly, if  ≥ Θ ≡ 1−
R 
0 () (),w h e r e
0 ≤ Θ ≤ 1, there exists a unique 1 − ¯  ()  ∞ that solves (49). If Θ, the unconstrained
equilibrium does not exist.
The critical value ¯  () satisﬁes
¯  ()=
 (1 − )(1− Θ)
 − Θ

Accordingly, for a given policy () for which the participation constraint (23) is satisﬁed, if
 ≥ ¯  (), the bond price  and the cutoﬀ value ˜  satisfy Proposition 1. If ¯  (), the bond
price  and the cutoﬀ value ˜  satisfy Proposition 2.
STEP 2: Existence and uniqueness
Note again that the maintained assumption is that policy () is such that the participation
constraint (23) is satisﬁed.
Consider  ≥ ¯  (). Then, ˜  =  and  =  so existence and uniqueness follows trivially.
Consider  ≤ ¯  (). Rewrite equations (27) and (29) that solve for the bond price  and the
critical value ˜  as follows:23
 − (1 − )














 ()=0  (51)
Equation (51) is decreasing in (˜ ) space with  =  at ˜  = . Equation (50) is increasing in
(˜ ) space. Moreover, at ˜  =  we have  ≥ . To see this, evaluate (50) at ˜  =  to get
 − (1 − )
−1 − (1 − )
= Θ (52)
If we solve this equation for ,w eg e t
 =
Θ
 +( Θ − 1)(1 − )





0 (˜ ) ()+
 
˜  1 ()

−1. Then add and subtract
 ˜ 





0 [(˜ ) − 1] ()+1

− 1 and rearrange to get (50).
28Then,  ≥  implies
 ≤ ¯  ()=
 (1 − )(1− Θ)
 − Θ

which is true since by assumption  ≤ ¯  (). Furthermore, in any constrained equilibrium, we have
 ≤ 1. To see this, from (52), we have
 − (1 − )
−1 − (1 − )
= Θ ≤ 1
implying  ≤ 1.H e n c e ,f o r ≤ ¯  () there exists a unique (˜ ) that solves (50) and (51) with
 ∈ [1] and ˜  ≤ .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . The proof involves two steps. We ﬁrst derive the borrowing constraint.
We then derive the equilibrium conditions (35) and (37).
STEP 1: Borrowing constraint
To derive the maximal loan, consider a household of type  that enters market 3 in  and repays
t h el o a ni ne v e r yp e r i o df o ra l l. Its expected payoﬀ in market 3 is





() ()+ (∗) − 
¾

where  are hours worked in the current period in market 3 if it repays the loan and is expected
hours worked in future periods. Suppose a household deviates by not repaying in the current and all
future periods (we could also use the one-step deviation principle to arrive at the same participation
constraint). Since ˆ  = ∗ a deviator’s expected discounted utility is





(ˆ ) ()+ (∗) − ˆ 
¾

It then follows that the participation constraint satisﬁes  ≥  ˆ  which requires









ˆ  − 
´
 (53)
Deriving : On the equilibrium path, an  household arrives in market 3 with − −
money and  bonds. It receives the transfer −1 and it leaves market 3 with +1 money.
Accordingly, current hours worked on the equilibrium path are
 = ∗ + +1 − −1 − ( −  − ) −  (54)
Deriving ˆ : On the equilibrium path, an  household arrives in market 3 with − −
money and  bonds. If the household deviates by not repaying the loan, it leaves market 3 with
ˆ +1. Note that it gets no lump-sum transfer from the government.24 Accordingly, current hours
24We could assume that all lump-sum transfers are paid out in mkt 1 so that a necessary requirement to get the
transfers is participation in ﬁnancial markets. This assumption would generate the same borrowing constraint.
29worked by a deviator are
ˆ  = ∗ + ˆ +1 − ( −  − )
The diﬀerence in current hours worked  − ˆ  is
 − ˆ  = (+1 − ˆ +1) − −1 −  (55)








s i n c em a r k e tc l e a r i n gi m p l i e s
R 
0  ()=0and  =1 . In equilibrium, +1 =  and












: In the future a deviator holds ˆ  − ˆ  units of money arriving in market 3
and leaves the market with ˆ +1. A deviator’s market 3 hours are then
ˆ  = ∗ + (ˆ +1 − ˆ )+ˆ 








Thus the diﬀerence in expected hours worked is
ˆ  −  = (ˆ +1 − ˆ )+
Z 
0




Using (55) and (56), we can write the borrowing constraint (53) as follows






(ˆ +1 − ˆ )
Use the deviator’s critical consumption ˆ ˆ  = ˆ  to get







Then, since  = +1 − −1 the maximal loan  satisﬁes






ˆ ˆ  (57)
30Finally, use the budget constraint of any agent  =  −  to replace − to get







Finally, replace  = −1 =
R 
0  () and replace  by its largest value ˜  to get (34):









ˆ ˆ  − (1)˜ 
From (17),  depend on  and ˜  only. Moreover, as shown at the beginning of the Appendix, ˆ  and
ˆ ˆ  depend on  only. Accordingly, the right-hand side of (34) can be summarized by the function
ΩI (˜ ) which depends on policy , the bond price , and the critical cutoﬀ value ˜  only.
STEP 2: Equilibrium conditions
To derive (37), divide (15) by , substitute −1 by , and substitute 0() by 1 to get
 =1 
To derive (35) note that in the unconstrained equilibrium, the  household must have enough
funds to pay for its consumption; i.e.,  ≤  + . Use (57) to substitute  to get







Finally, replace  = −1 =
R 
0  () and divide by  to get (35):









ˆ ˆ  − (1)
From (17)  depends on  and ˜  =  only. Moreover, as shown at the beginning of the Appendix,
ˆ  depends on  only. Accordingly, the right-hand side of (35) can be summarized by the function
ΦI (˜ ) which depends on policy  and bond price  only.
Note that in a unconstrained equilibrium ΩI (˜ )=ΦI (˜ ) which implies that if the
borrowing constraint holds, then it must be the case that the budget constraint is satisﬁed as well.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . To derive (40), divide (15) by , substitute −1 by , and substitute











To derive (38) note that in the constrained equilibrium, the critical household’s budget con-
straint holds with equality; i.e., ˜  = +. Use (57) to substitute  in the budget constraint
to get







31Finally, replace  = −1 =
R 
0  () and divide by  to get (38):









ˆ ˆ  − (1)˜ 
Note that in a constrained equilibrium ΩI (˜ )=ΦI (˜ )=0which implies that if the
borrowing constraint holds at equality, then it must be the case that the budget constraint holds
at equality as well.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 . The proof involves three steps. In the ﬁrst step, we show that any
unconstrained equilibrium allocation in the inside bonds economy can be replicated in the outside
bonds economy. In the second step, we prove that any constrained equilibrium allocation in the
inside bonds economy can be replicated in the outside bonds economy. In both cases, we show that
the allocations are replicated by choosing the same  and charging max,w h e r emax is the value
of  such that the participation constraint (23) in the outside bond economy holds with equality
for a given value of . I nt h et h i r ds t e p ,w ep r o v i d ea ne x a m p l eo fa na l l o c a t i o ni nt h eo u t s i d e
bonds economy that cannot be replicated in the inside bonds economy.
First step: Replication of the unconstrained equilibrium allocation
Consider a policy  such that an unconstrained equilibrium exists in the inside bond economy.
Then, the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes
˜  = ,  =  and















We now replicate this allocation in the outside bonds economy by choosing the same  as in
the inside bonds economy and by charging max.I fmax is charged, the participation constraint
(48) holds at equality; i.e.,







Then, use the government budget constraint (20) to replace max−1 to get






ˆ ˆ  (58)
To derive the budget constraint ΦO (˜ max) note that in any unconstrained equilibrium
 ≤ −1 + −1. Use (58) to substitute −1 to get







32Divide by ,u s e−1 =
R 
0  (),a n ds e t =  to get
















ΦI ()=ΦO ( max) ≥ 0
Then, since ΦO ( max) ≥ 0 and ΩO ( max) ≥ 0 the equilibrium allocation
satisﬁes Proposition 1 with,  =  and ˜  = .M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e is the same as in the inside
bonds economy, consumption  is the same for all .
Second step: Replication of the constrained equilibrium allocation. Now consider a





















ˆ ˆ  − (1)˜ 
with ˜  ≤ .
We now replicate this allocation in the outside bonds economy by choosing the same  as in
the inside bonds economy and by charging max.I fmax is charged, the participation constraint
(48) holds at equality; i.e.,







Then, use (20) to replace max−1 to get






ˆ ˆ  (59)
To derive the feasibility constraint ΦO (˜ max), note that in any constrained equilibrium
˜  = −1 + −1. Use (59) to substitute −1 in this equality to get







Finally, use −1 =
R 
0  (),d i v i d eb y and rearrange to get









ˆ ˆ  − (1)˜ 
If the same  is chosen, then
ΦI (˜ )=ΦO (˜ max)=0 
33Since  and ˜  solve the same two equations as in the inside bonds economy, consumption  is the
same for all  in the outside bonds economy.
Third step: The converse is not true
T h ec o n v e r s ei sn o tt r u eb e c a u s et h e r ea r ep o l i c i e s() in the outside bond economy that
result in allocations that cannot be replicated in the inside bond economy. We prove this by
example. Consider the case of  max and a constrained equilibrium in the outside bonds
economy ¯  (). For this case, from (50) and (51), O and ˜ O (for this proof we use the index
O for variables in the outside bonds economy and the index I for the inside economy) satisfy
 − (1 − )
−1















 ()=0  (61)
Note that O and ˜ O depend on .
To replicate the above allocation in the inside bonds economy, the equilibrium in the inside bonds
economy has to be constrained. Accordingly, assume that the chosen  implements a constrained





















 ()=0  (63)
It is straightforward to show that if we substitute  = max, we can transform (60) into (62) which
implies that for  = max the two mechanisms generate the same allocation. It is then also clear
that I and ˜ I do not replicate O and O for  max since, for example, the allocation in the
inside bonds economy depends on the deviator’s consumption ˆ  while the allocation in the outside
bonds economy is independent of ˆ .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 . The proof involves showing that, for a given , it is optimal to increase
 to max.W eﬁrst consider the case of the constrained equilibrium; i.e., assume that policy ()
is such that the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes Proposition 2. Furthermore, assume that  max.
In this case the bond price  and the critical value ˜  satisfy (50) and (51) which we replicate here
for easier reference:
 − (1 − )














 ()=0  (65)
Recall that (64) is increasing in (˜ ) space and (65) is decreasing. Then, note from (64) that an
34increase in  shifts (64) down and to the right in (˜ ) space.25 Since (65) does not move, it follows
that

  0 and that ˜ 
  0.
Welfare is given by
(1 − )W =
Z ˜ 
0
[() − ] ()+
Z 
˜ 
[(˜ ) − ˜ ] ()+ (∗) − ∗



















For all households we have 0 () ≥ 1 so the bracketed terms are positive. Thus, the sign of
this derivative hinges on the signs of  and ˜ .F o ra l l˜ , 0 ()=1and for  =˜ ,




























where () ≡− 00 ()0 () (observe that for this proof we do not need a constant ). Note
that
˜ 




 + ˜ 

1

















Use this expression to replace ˜ 

1


































From (65), we get −
R ˜ 














˜   0.
We now establish that W
  0. From (66), W











0 (˜ ) − 1
¤ ˜ 

 ()  0
25To see this, deﬁne Γ =
−(1−)
−1−(1−).T h e n
Γ
 ' 1 −  ≥ 0 and
Γ
 '  − (1 − ) ≥ 0 which establishes the
result.































 ()  0
Then, use (69) to replace ˜ 

1































˜  (˜ ) ()
#







  0 and multiply by
R 



























˜  (˜ ) ()=1−
R 
˜   ()=
R ˜ 




















Next use (17) to replace 0 () to get
Z 
˜ 










It is evident that
R ˜ 
0  () 
R ˜ 
0 ˜  () since   ˜  for ˜ . Furthermore,
Z 
˜ 
(˜ )(1 − 1) () 
Z 
˜ 
[(˜ ) − 1] ()
since
R 
˜   () 
R 
˜  (˜ ) (). Hence, we have just established that W
  0 if policy ()
is such that the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes Proposition 2 and  max.
We next consider the case of the unconstrained equilibrium; i.e., assume that policy () is
such that the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes Proposition 1. Again, assume that  max.I nt h i s
case, the bond price satisﬁes  =  and ˜  = . It is straightforward to show that a change in ,
holding  constant, does not aﬀect consumption and production since it does not aﬀect the bond
price .I to n l ya ﬀects −1 via the government’s budget constraint (20). While this changes the
total wealth of the household, it does not aﬀect consumption since in a unconstrained equilibrium
no household spends all its wealth for consumption in market 2. Consequently, if policy () is
such that the equilibrium allocation satisﬁes Proposition 1 and  max,t h e nW
 =0 .
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 . The proof contains two steps. We ﬁrst show that any equilibrium in
the outside bonds economy requires that  ≥ 1. We then show that this implies that under optimal
policies the allocations are the same.
36STEP 1: In any equilibrium  ≥ 1.
The idea of the proof of this step is as follows. Using the participation constraint (23), we ﬁrst
derive an upper bound for the fee ,c a l l e d˘ max, such that in any equilibrium  ≤ ˘ max.W et h e n
show that if 1, ˘ max  0. This implies that in any equilibrium with 1,  ≤ ˘ max  0.
Then, from the government budget constraint, we have




Since in any equilibrium the left-hand side of the government budget constraint is non-negative,
0 if 1. Thus, we have  ≤ ˘ max  0 which is a contradiction. Accordingly, for
1, the participation constraint and the government budget constraint cannot possibly hold
simultaneously.
We now derive the upper bound ˘ max. For this purpose, we assume that the deviator is punished
more harshly than what we actually impose in the paper. Since the punishment is harsher, the
maximal fee that the government can ask without violating the participation constraint with the
new punishment must be larger than the maximal fee that the government can ask without violating
the participation constraint under the original punishment; i.e., ˘ max ≥ max,w h e r e˘ max is the
value of  that makes the participation constraint binding under this harsher punishment.
The harsher punishment that we impose is that a deviator is forced to consume the same
quantities in the goods market as an household that pays the fee. Note that this is a harsher
punishment because a deviator is not allowed to choose his consumption in the goods market
optimally and must carry more cash than he desires. In what follows, we use the upper script "`"
to indicate the quantities of a deviator under this harsher punishment. To calculate the expected
discounted utility under this harsher punishment, we have to calculate ˘  and ˘ ,w h e r e˘  is
the hours worked in the last market in the period of the defection, and ˘  is the expected hours
worked in any of the following periods.
Deriving ˘ : On the equilibrium path, an  household arrives in market 3 with − −
money and  +  bonds. If the household deviates by not paying the fee, it leaves market 3 with
˘ +1 = +1 + +1 money. Note that in order to be able to consume the same quantities as an
equilibrium agent, he has to bring in +1 + +1 units of money into the period. Accordingly,
current hours worked by a deviator under this harsher punishment are
˘  = ∗ + (+1 + +1) − ( −  − ) − ( + )
Then, using (44), the diﬀerence in current hours worked  − ˘  is





: In the future a deviator under this harsher punishment holds ˘  − ˘  units
37of money arriving in market 3 and leaves with ˘ +1. A deviator’s market 3 hours are then
˘  = ∗ + (˘ +1 − ˘ )+˘ 








Finally, from (46), the diﬀerence in expected hours worked is
˘  −  = (˘ +1 − ˘ ).( 7 1 )






[() − (˘ )] ()+

1 − 
(˘ +1 − ˘ )
Finally, replacing the quantities ˘  with , and noting that ˘ +1 = ˘  and ˘  = ( + )=



















( − 1) (72)
Note that ˘ max  0 if 1. This implies that in any equilibrium of the outside bonds economy
(with the original punishment)  ≤ ˘ max  0 if 1. Now, consider the budget constraint of the
government:
 − 1+ =
−1
−1
(1 − ) (73)
Since in any equilibrium the left-hand side of (73) is non-negative, 0 if 1. Thus, we have
 ≤ ˘ max  0 which is a contradiction. Hence, any equilibrium in the outside bonds economy
requires that  ≥ 1.
STEP 2: Under optimal policies the allocations are the same.
Denote ∗ ≥ 1 the optimal policy in the inside bonds economy. Then, Propositions 6 and 7
imply that we can replicate the corresponding allocation in the outside bonds economy by choosing
the policy (∗ max).
Note that the STEP 1 of the proof is important since it tells us that there is no allocation in
the outside bonds economy with 1 that dominates the allocation under ∗ in the inside bonds
economy.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 . The proof involves three steps. We ﬁrst show that the critical value
38¯  () satisﬁes ¯  ()  1. We then show that it is optimal to set ¯  (). Finally, we show that it
is optimal to set 1 if  ≥ ˜ .
STEP 1: The critical value satisﬁes ¯  ()  1.
Consider a policy ( =¯  ()). Then, no household is constrained and  = .A s s u m e -
to the contrary - that ¯  () ≤ 1. Then, from (72), we have  ≤ ˘ max ≤ 0, and, from (73), we get
¯  () − 1+ =
−1
−1 (1 − ) (since  = )i m p l y i n gt h a t0. Combining the two conditions,
we get  ≤ ˘ max ≤ 0 which is a contradiction. Hence, ¯  ()  1.
STEP 2: The optimal  satisﬁes ¯  ().
In equilibrium, welfare is given by
(1 − )W =
Z 
0
[() − ] ()+ (∗) − ∗










0 () − 1
¤ 

¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=¯ ()
 ()















¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=¯ ()
 ()
Since  =   1 at  =¯  (), the sign of this derivative hinges on the sign of .F r o mt h e
household’s FOC we have 0 ()= with







 0.( 7 4 )




 0 so lowering  at  =¯  () is welfare improving
STEP 3: The optimal  satisﬁes 1 if  ≥ ˜ .

















 ()  0

















˜  − 1
¢
 ()=0and











 ()˜  =0and ˜ 0 (˜ ) + 0 (˜ )˜  +˜ 00 (˜ )˜  =0 














































ˆ ˆ  +
¡
˜ 2¢
 − (1)˜  =0 










































































(˜ ) () − 1
¸
 0
Use this result to substitute






















 0 we need
˜ 
  0 since  is decreasing in . This requires that +(1 − )
R 
0 (˜ ) ()−

R 



















Since in any constrained equilibrium 0 
R 
0 (˜ ) () as u ﬃcient condition for
˜ 





















˜  − 1
¢
 ()=
400,w eh a v e ˜ 
  0, which implies that the right-hand side of (76) is decreasing in .T h u s ,t h e r e
exists a critical value 12 ≤ ˜ 1,w h e r e˜  is the value of  that solves (76) at equality, such that
if  ≥ ˜ , W

¯ ¯
¯
=1
 0.
41